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 Abstract 
Ronald Coase drew the attention of main stream economists to the 
significance of social coordination in the economic system. The key role was 
played here by much-disputed political conclusions drawn from Coase’s idea as 
well as by his famous theorem and the zero transaction costs theory. The study 
focuses on the division of labor as a starting point for analysis of zero 
transaction costs. From this vantage point, the best example of the world of zero 
transaction costs is Robinson Crusoe’s island. However, very often the concept 
of zero transaction costs is associated with the assumption of perfect 
information. If we stretch this assumption to its logical limits, then there is no 
market mechanism and all impediments related to the central planning system 
disappear. This interpretation is in line with the Hayekian interpretation of the 
market as a mechanism for acquiring knowledge. 
 1. Introduction 
Ronald Coase is recognized for his contribution to the field of transaction 
costs economics. He pointed out that transaction costs were the crucial element 
in explaining why corporations existed and grew. The approach has developed 
and tested by Oliver Williamson who was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Economics in 2009. Despite the fact that Ronald Coase’s essay, The Problem of 
Social Cost, is one of the most cited article in the economics, Coase’s ideas are 
often misreported. The aim of this paper is to identify the distinctive features of 
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Coase’s approach and to consider his contribution to development of economic 
theory. 
 2. The issue of coordination and transaction costs 
Ronald Coase’s contribution to the development of economic thought 
results from his unconventional approach to economic issues and is reflected in 
posing unusual questions. Why do enterprises and entrepreneurs exist as factors 
of production if, according to orthodox theory, the price system provides  
a sufficient mechanism of coordination? How can we reconcile economists’ 
conviction about the role of the price system and the unfeasibility of central 
planning with the existence of great corporations (such as General Motors) in the 
market economy? Why would the Soviet economy not work as one huge factory 
in the way Lenin fathomed it? 
In his lecture given on the occasion of being awarded Nobel Prize, Coase 
said that he had found the answer to the above questions back in 1932. He 
realized that there are some costs related to the use of the price mechanism. 
These are the costs of negotiations, contracting, and gathering information which 
must be incurred in order to “discover prices”. The existence of costs related to 
the functioning of markets justifies an alternative method of coordination – 
coordination within a company through hierarchic management (Coase 1992,  
p. 715). The above questions and the idea of transaction costs are included in his 
famous first article The Nature of Firm (Coase 1937). 
Coase presented companies and markets as cost-entailing alternative 
methods of coordination. In this way, he discovered that transaction costs were 
part of overall production costs and a selection criterion for the mechanism of 
coordination. In a system based on economic freedom and competition, optimal 
planning in companies is established as a result of comparison between internal 
coordination costs and transaction costs arising from using the market.  
A prerequisite for a company to be “a small planned society” is to provide the 
coordination function at a cost lower than the transaction costs indispensable to 
obtain particular goods through the market. The functioning of the market does 
not occur free of charge and an enterprise is a tool to minimize the cost of 
market functioning. An enterprise emerges when the internal system of 
coordination is less expensive than the application of the market mechanism 
(Coase 1937,1992).  
But why does the firm not expand to a full monopoly which internalizes 
all of its transactions; in other words, why is it not possible for the whole 
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national economy to merge into one enterprise? This is due to the fact that 
hierarchic management also entails costs and the function of the entrepreneur is 
subject to the law of diminishing returns. When a firm grows in size, from  
a certain point in time the management may no longer be able to control the 
stream of information. Before information reaches the decision center, it 
becomes distorted on the various levels of management. The risk of making 
wrong allocation decisions increases. There is then, an optimum size of an 
enterprise, which is the volume of production at which internal organization 
entails the same costs as bargaining. Coase’s theory is a specific form of 
application of marginal calculation. An enterprise internalizes its transactions 
until the internal marginal costs of management equal market transaction costs. 
Orthodox economists regard market mechanism as an optimal mechanism 
for co-ordination of economic activities and allocation of resources but disregard 
the costs of this coordination. While analyzing the allocation of production 
factors, the proponents of market mechanism focused their attention on costs of 
turning resources into the final product to be placed in the market. They 
implicitly assumed that the exchange itself does not cost anything and does not 
engage any resources. R. Coase posed a provocative question: Why do firms 
exist? He stressed the existence of market coordination costs (Coase1 which he 
considered a reason for the existence of alternative coordination, feasible in 
enterprises, thus indicating another type of transaction costs – management costs 
in companies. Therefore, an effective system of competition is necessary not 
only for the markets to exist but also for shaping the right extent of planning 
within the company, thus minimizing management costs. 
Coase in his groundbreaking article defined transaction costs as costs of 
using price mechanism. Although the term “transaction costs” is regularly used 
in the literature devoted to new institutional economics, the definition of this 
notion is still under deliberation (Dollery 2001, Allen 2000). In its broadest 
sense transaction costs are the costs of social coordination or the costs of the 
operation of the economic system. Since exercising and transferring property 
rights form the central issue of social coordination, transaction costs are often 
referred to as all costs related to the transfer of property rights from one 
bargaining partner to another. All transaction costs understood as costs of market 
operation comprise costs of searching for information and partners, costs of 
negotiation of contract conditions, costs of settling possible claims resulting 
from implementation of contracts, and also costs related to uncertainty, e.g. 
change of prices or supplier’s bankruptcy.  
                                                 
1
 (R. Coase, The Nature of Firm, [in:] The Firm, the Market and the Law, ed. cit., p. 38-39). 
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Subsequently, analysis of the transaction cost notion understood as costs 
of co-ordination led to the identification of political transaction costs. Apart 
from the costs of particular transactions born directly by partners to bargaining 
and costs of managing companies there are also costs of creating and 
maintaining institutional and legal structures, financed by the state budget. The 
outlays incurred in the process of exercising judicial, legislative, and executive 
power on the establishment and maintenance of political institutions and 
organizations which form indispensable conditions for social coordination are 
referred to as the political costs of transactions. The language of transaction cost 
economics defines in this manner the costs of institutional and legal functions of 
the state. The implications of political transaction costs and the issue of market 
effectiveness were discussed in particular by Douglass North (1990, pp. 47 – 52; 
Furubotn E. G., Richter, pp. 39 – 54). 
Coase further develops his transaction cost theory in his famous second 
article Problem of Social Cost (1960). The notion of transaction costs is 
presented here in the context of a new approach to social issues and private 
production costs and a modification of conclusions regarding the involvement of 
the state in the economic sphere. While questioning the core of Arthur Pigou’s 
welfare economics Coase used, remarkably, the term of zero transaction costs, 
which became the subject of heated debate and many misunderstandings. 
Presenting Coase’s standpoint, Stiegler formed a thesis which he named the 
Coase theorem. This theorem contributed to the popularization of transaction 
costs, new institutional economy ideas and Coase himself2. The popularity of 
Stigler-Coase theorem did not, however, mean that Coase’s standpoint and 
transaction cost economics were properly understood. 
 3. The Coase Theorem – various formulations 
The idea of the so-called Coase Theorem comes from Coase himself, but 
it was George Stigler who first formulated the theorem criticizing Arthur 
Pigou’s stance against the issue of negative externalities in the 3rd edition of 
Price Theory:  
„The Coase theorem thus asserts that under perfect competition private 
and social costs will be equal [and] the composition of output will not be 
                                                 
2
 Coase himself writes about interest in his ideas and famous theorem. See: Lives of the 
Laureates. Thirteen Nobel Economists, ed. W. Breit, R. W. Spencer, MIT Press, Cambridge-
London 2002, pp. 247 – 248. 
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affected by the manner in which the law assigns liability for damage” (Stigler 
1966, p. 113). 
Stigler’s interpretation made the proponents of free market economy use 
Coase’s views to justify explicit rejection of state intervention in the market and 
led the economists critical to free market to conclude that Coase’s view is 
nothing more than an attempt to restore the Smithsonian principle of “the 
invisible hand” of the market. It was so because it was a common practice to 
focus on the second part of the famous theorem and at the same time to neglect 
the caveat: “in conditions of perfect competition”. In subsequent formulations of 
the Coase theorem the above-mentioned caveat is replaced by the condition: “in 
a world of zero transaction costs” or “in the absence of transaction costs”. 
“In a world of zero transaction costs, regardless of how the property rights 
are assigned initially, resources will be utilized efficiently in the sense that the 
value of production will be maximized with transaction costs being interpreted 
as the costs of search, bargaining, and enforcement of contract” (Hsiung 1999, 
p.153). 
“The Coase theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, an 
efficient or optimal economic result occurs regardless of who owns the property 
rights. The free market guarantees the efficient outcome regardless of who owns 
what, because there will remain incentives to bargain towards the efficient result 
until it is achieved” (Schafly 2007, p. 45).  
The formulations of the Coase theorem based on “a world of zero 
transaction costs” facilitate understanding Coase’s views, since this assumption, 
in opposition to the principle of perfect competition, directs one’s attention to 
the proper (from Coase’s vantage point) aspect of economic issues. Coase 
frequently explained that the real world is a world of positive transaction costs, 
and an assumption of zero transaction costs was only a metaphor which was to 
point out serious drawbacks of orthodox economics, especially that it fails to 
address the issue of coordination. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that it is 
the formulation of the Coase theorem made by Steven Medema that brings us as 
close as possible both to the real world and to Coase’s economics. In the 
formulation suggested by Medema, the costs of coordination are explicitly 
presented as are the implications of the fact that these are not zero costs. 
“…Coase pointed out that, in a world in which coordination costs are 
zero, externality problems also could be efficiently resolved through either  
a single-owner firm (which would take all relevant costs into account) or the 
government, which could employ various “Pigouvian” remedies to internalize 
the external costs. However, he argued that the reality of coordination costs – 
costs associated with market transactions, transactions within the firm, and the 
bureaucratic, legislative, informational, rent-seeking, etc. processes associated 
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with the Pigouvian remedies – and the fact that these costs differ across 
mechanisms imply that the final allocation of resources will be impacted by the 
mechanism employed to resolve externality problems” (Medema 1996, p. 573). 
 4. The world of zero transaction costs  
Transaction costs are often regarded as the result of imperfect information 
and, accordingly, the world of zero transaction costs is presented as a world of 
perfect information. Following step by step the logical implication of the 
assumption of perfect information one may conclude that there are no markets, 
prices, or money in a society with perfect information. “Since information is 
complete, the buyer enjoys all the relevant information he needs; therefore he 
does not have to search in the market. Similarly, the seller does not have to go to 
the market to attract buyers. As a result, both the buyer and the seller can make 
their respective decisions and conduct transaction at home” (Hsiung 1999,  
p. 156). Since there are neither prices nor money, the concept of the value of 
production loses its basis. 
Let us notice that such conception of the world of zero transaction costs is 
not in line with the conception of Coase who illustrated his reasoning with 
examples and made references to prices Coase 1990, p. 98, 140, 160)3. His 
insight and numerous examples regarding transaction costs undoubtedly referred 
to an economy of prices and money. The reasoning which provides full logical 
implications of the premise of perfect information is, nevertheless, rational and it 
shows that the world of zero transaction costs is far more extraordinary than 
Coase himself implied (Hsiung , p. 157). 
The world of zero transaction costs interpreted as a world of perfect 
information has no reference to reality and is even hard to imagine. How can we 
imagine the results of the fact that everybody knows everything about other 
people’s behavior and knows their future? And if there are no prices or money, 
how are goods and services delivered to consumers? A possible solution seems 
to lie in a system in which distribution is effected by means of a central plan. 
Since we possess full information, there disappears the justification for the 
market mechanism as a source of information and, on the other hand, there 
disappears the principal reason for central planning failure. We may emphasize 
the absurdity of the perfect knowledge thesis if we observe that the situation of 
                                                 
3
 R. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law, The University Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London 1990, pp. 98, 140, 160. 
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perfect knowledge in which everybody knows everything brings about  
a situation in which there is no place for human freedom or striving for 
knowledge. 
There is, however, an easier way to imagine the world of zero transaction 
costs – a way which would point out an aspect of the economy which is often 
disregarded by neo-classical economics, but to which Coase pays attention. The 
starting point might not be the perfect information but the issue of the division of 
labor. If transaction costs are cooperation costs, then these costs do not exist if 
production does not require cooperation between people. Such a situation takes 
place in the world of Robinson Crusoe with one manufacturer and one 
consumer; transactions, money and prices are not necessary, and all of this is 
due to the fact that there is no division of labor. Considering both criteria – 
perfect information and division of labor – it appears that the real world is  
a world of positive transaction costs which can exist in various forms of market 
economy as well as in real socialism (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The relationship between the world of zero transaction costs and the perfectness of 
information and division of labor 
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Source: Author’s own work. 
The world of zero transaction costs presented as Robinson Crusoe’s island 
is not only more readily imaginable but also has some important advantages 
from the vantage point of transaction cost economics. Firstly, as Coase pointed 
out, it reveals a real problem of neo-classical economics, and secondly, it does 
not lead to the simple but erroneous conclusion that the lower transaction costs 
the closer we get to the economic optimum. The conclusion which is often 
drawn from the Coase theorem that the lower the transaction costs are, the more 
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effective resource allocation is, is not correct since transaction costs are not only 
dependent on the quality of institutions but also on the extent of the division of 
labor. An increase in the division of labor does not unidirectionally affect total 
production costs; it decreases production costs – the eternal focus point of neo-
classical economics, that is, the costs of transforming production factors into 
final goods, but it entails an increase in the number of transactions, thus 
provoking an increase in transaction costs. On the basis of transaction cost 
economics it may only be asserted that at a given level of division of labor 
resource allocation becomes more effective with more effective institutions, 
more efficient cooperation, and thus lower transaction costs. Research based on 
this economics also reveals that economic development is related to an increase 
in the share of transaction costs in the global social product4.  
Given the indisputable importance of the division of labor in improving 
the conditions of human existence, the premise of absolute minimization of 
transaction costs is just as absurd as the world of zero transaction costs. The 
principal direction of the influence of the division of labor on transformation and 
transaction costs is presented in Figure 2. 
                                                 
4
 The first attempt to measure transaction costs was undertaken by North and Wallis, who 
divided the structure of national income into the production sector (agriculture, industry, mining, 
construction, transport, and services) and transaction sector (banking, insurance, real estate market, 
wholesale and retail trade, administration and public safety, national defense). According to their 
estimations, the share of transaction costs (services) engaged in the transaction sector in GNP rose 
from 26% in 1870 to 54.7% in 1970 (Furubotn, Richter, 2000, p. 52). A similar tendency was 
observed in Australia: transaction costs which in 1911 accounted for 32 % of GDP rose in 1991 to 
60% of GDP. This strong upward trend was not confirmed by the research of transaction sector in 
Argentina, as it revealed that the share of transaction sector in the GDP there slightly changed 
from 25% of GDP in 1930 to 28% of GDP in 1970, and in the following decade rose to 35% of 
GDP and remained at that level until 1990 (Wang 2003, p. 4). It should be stressed that research 
aimed at measuring transaction costs is in its initial stage and the concept of the transaction sector 
as a means of measuring transaction costs as well as the method of its evaluation might be 
considered controversial. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between transformation and transaction costs on division of labor 
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The intersection of the curve of transformation costs, diminishing with rising division of labor, with the 
upward transaction costs line depicts a state of economy in which the share of transaction costs in overall 
production costs reached 50%. 
Source: Author’s own work. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between transformation and transaction costs on division of labor and 
quality of institution 
Transaction costs increase with the growth of division of labor, but depending on the quality of institutions 
(both formal and informal) transactions with an equal degree of division of labor may engage different 
amounts of resources. The TC curve depicts an economy in which the higher quality of institution ensures 
better coordination of activities and lower transaction costs. The shift of the TC curve to TC’ illustrates  
a higher level of transaction costs at each level of division of labor which is a consequence of less effective 
institutions and the resulting poor cooperation. The problem of choosing optimal proportions between using 
the market or state regulation is in fact the problem of transaction costs optimization. The problem is even 
more complex than suggested by the graph below, since institutional solutions affect not only the level of 
transaction costs but also the level of transformation costs. 
Source: Author’s own study. 
 5. The significance of the Coase theorem 
The significance of the Coase theorem does not result from its truth but 
from drawing the attention of economists to the quality of coordination of 
activities in economic processes. The significance of coordination which 
depends on the institutional structure of the society is revealed through its 
impact on production costs, which are termed transaction costs. These costs, 
thanks to the famous theorem, became a subject of heated dispute and exerted 
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immense influence both on the development of economic theory and on its 
ensuing conclusions regarding the choice of a resource allocation mechanism 
and economic policy. Due to the manner in which the issue of transaction costs 
was introduced into economic dispute, it seems appropriate to start the 
presentation of its significance with questions regarding state intervention into 
the market mechanism. 
 5.1. The nature of negative externalities and the significance of the law 
The Coase theorem and thereby the significance of the transaction costs 
emerged in the context of negative externalities. First, in The Federal 
Communications Commission (Coase 1959) and then in his famous The Problem 
of Social Cost Coase questioned Arthur Pigou’s acclaimed view that market 
failures displayed in the form of negative externalities absolutely justify state 
intervention into the market mechanism. Coase suggested two theoretical 
innovations: to consider bilateral character of origins of negative externalities 
and to extend the notion of production factor. 
Negative externalities result not only from one party’s actions 
(traditionally regarded as the perpetrator), but they emerge due to the other 
party’s (traditionally regarded as the victim) actions as well. If we adopt Pigou’s 
vantage point and in advance charge the party regarded as the unilateral 
perpetrator with all costs of the conflict then the party regarded as the victim has 
no stimulus to seek measures to minimize losses. On the contrary, if the party 
regarded as the victim receives compensation for the losses incurred, it has  
a stimulus to maintain the existing solution irrespective of possible alternative 
solutions. Coase proved therefore that optimal solutions may require a change of 
conduct on the part of the victim party and asserted that solutions suggested by 
Pigou’s economics are not optimal since they exclude adaptation on the part of 
those who are regarded as the victims of negative externalities. As Coase proved 
in his well-known article, paying compensation to the owners of farmland along 
railway tracks may lead to decreasing numbers of trains and passengers while 
encouraging people to continue farming in the area threatened with fires caused 
by sparks from coal-burning steam locomotives. Coase pointed out to the 
possibility of an alternative, socially more desirable solution: to move part of the 
farming activity to other places, thus maintaining a greater number of trains and 
passengers. It follows from Coase’s reasoning that intervention instruments 
proposed by Pigou may lead to a situation in which the interest of the owners of 
farmland along the railway are furthered not only at the cost of the railway 
operator but also passengers and that there is always the necessity to compare 
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advantages and costs related to the activities of both sides of any conflict which 
emerges on the grounds of negative externalities. It cannot be assumed in 
advance that the optimal solution is the one that assumes the status of one party 
(arbitrarily considered as the victim) as the status quo. 
At the same time it should be stressed that it does not follow from the 
Coase theorem that state intervention is always harmful or unnecessary. Rather, 
the presence of negative externalities does not justify making state intervention  
a rule of thumb. Coase explains that every case should be considered separately 
and that adopting one principle (intervention or non-intervention) is not correct 
as it does not lead to optimal solutions. The more general notion that can be 
drawn from Coase’s deliberations on negative externalities regards the 
significance of the law in economic processes. Contrary to what some may infer 
from the concise formulation of the famous theorem, Coase does bring our 
attention to the immense role of the law in the economic system. The law is 
important because the real world is a world of positive transaction costs and the 
level of these costs is to a large extent dependent on legal regulations which may 
facilitate or hinder contracting or transfer of property rights. 
“The same approach which, with zero transaction costs, demonstrates that 
the allocation of resources remains the same whatever the legal position, also 
shows that, with positive transaction costs, the law plays a crucial role in 
determining how resources are used. But it does more than this. With zero 
transaction costs, the same result is reached because contractual arrangements 
will be made to modify the rights and duties of the parties so as to make it in 
their interest to undertake those actions which maximize the value of production. 
With positive transaction costs, some or all of these contractual arrangements 
become too costly to carry out. The incentives to take some of the actions which 
would have maximized the value of production disappear. What incentives will 
be lacking depends on what the law is, since this determines what contractual 
arrangements will have to be made to bring about those actions which maximize 
the value of production. The result brought about by different legal rules is not 
intuitively obvious and depends on the facts of each particular case” (Coase 
1990, p. 178). The latter belief underlies Coase’s appeal to economists for 
empirical research. “My conclusion: let us study the world of positive 
transaction costs”– repeats Coase in his Nobel Prize lecture (Coase 1992,  
p.717). 
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 5.2 Planning and the market system 
Hayek’s epistemological perspective on the market system and central 
planning as alternative mechanisms of resource allocation is proven correct in 
view of analysis of the Coase theorem and the zero transaction cost assumption. 
An ideal system of central planning is possible in perfect information conditions. 
At the same time, perfect information causes such market institutions like prices 
or money to disappear along with economic calculus and choice constrained by 
this economic calculus (when the premise of perfect information is pushed to its 
logical limits the right solutions become self-evident and the individual does not 
have to chose, or, actually, cannot choose). 
However, when we exclude the unrealistic assumption of perfect 
information we will arrive at a world of positive transaction costs, in which in 
fact there does not exist choice between government planning and something 
which would be its complete opposite. Medema is right when he asserts that in 
fact we face a choice between various types of planning that in a different way 
affect both economic effectiveness and the interests of groups and individuals. 
This standpoint means that we treat the law that governs economic activity and 
regulates various spheres of individuals’ behavior as a sort of planning. Through 
its institutional and legal functions the state always performs its planning 
function. There always occur problems of coordination and its costs contribute 
to the costs of production. There is no perfect system of coordination, and in 
reality there are imperfect markets, firms and governments. The problem is that 
one has to constantly choose from among imperfect alternatives to the 
coordination mechanism that would be the most suitable in particular conditions 
for a particular group of transactions (Medema 1996, p. 576).  
 5.3 The development of economic theory 
The influence that the idea of transaction costs and the Coase theorem 
exerted on the development of contemporary economics cannot be 
overestimated. These concepts, thanks to their intellectual potential and an 
appealing form decisively contributed to drawing the attention of orthodox 
economists to problems which had pushed beyond the borders of mainstream 
economics due to fascination with the Walrasian concept of the general 
equilibrium. It was mainly due to the interest excited by Coase’s ideas that the 
issues of coordination of economic activities came under deliberation, which 
means that the social side of production became the subject of analysis. Drawing 
attention to transaction costs was tantamount to undertaking comparative 
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analysis of alternative mechanisms of resource allocation and their institutional 
determinants.  
Coase decisively contributed to the development of new institutional 
economics which rejected the neo-classical theory of growth and the vision of 
economics as a theory of rational choice – a theory independent of the 
institutional system. Through the concept of transaction costs, the most 
important idea of the new institutional economics, Coase followed by North 
showed that economic success does not only depend on technological progress 
but also, equally, on tha ability of the society to utilize available technologies. 
What is characteristic is Coase’s reply to a question about the significance of 
progress in electronic communication systems. “People talk about increases in 
improvements in technology, but just as important are improvements in the way 
in which people make contracts and deals. If you can lower the costs there, you 
can have more specialization and greater production. So that’s what I’m 
interested in now. By improving the way the market works, you can produce 
immense benefits, not because it invents new technologies, but because it 
enables new technologies to be used.” (Coase 1997). Coase stressed the role of 
the law in the process of improving conditions of exchange, while North 
extended his analysis of the society’s ability to utilize technologies to area of 
culture, ideology and politics.  
 6. Summary 
The idea that the economic process is not autonomous is not new. The 
social character of economy was noted by Adam Smith, and later it used to be 
the domain of schools regarded as heterodox. Furthermore, thanks to Coase, the 
approach to economic issues, typical for heterodox economics became a point of 
interest for mainstream economists. It happened so probably due to three 
reasons. First, the term “transaction costs” is perceived as a technical term which 
is ideologically neutral like production costs. The notion of transaction costs, 
although controversial, is for economists an appealing means of expressing the 
costs which are the result of the social determinants of the economic process. 
The interest in the world of transaction costs was enhanced by the intriguing 
concept of “zero transaction costs”. Establishing economic effectiveness as the 
final criterion of analysis was the second factor promoting the acceptance of the 
paradigm of transaction costs. 
The third aspect of the attractiveness of the paradigm of transaction costs 
was related to the controversies around the political conclusions. The new 
approach to the issue of negative externalities, the enhancement of arguments of 
                                        The Coase theorem and idea of transaction costs…                                 75 
 
the pro-market orientation and finally, the issues which emerged in relation to 
the crisis of the central planning system – all of these raised interest and growing 
recognition for this institutional research perspective. 
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 Streszczenie 
 
ZNACZENIE TEOREMATU COASE’A I IDEI KOSZTÓW TRANSAKCJI  
W ROZWOJU EKONOMII 
  
Ronald Coase skierował uwagę ekonomistów głównego nurtu na znaczenie 
społecznej koordynacji w systemie ekonomicznym. Kluczową rolę odegrały tu zarówno 
kontrowersyjne wnioski polityczne wyprowadzane z idei Coase’a, jak i słynny teoremat 
 i koncepcja zerowych kosztów transakcji. W artykule uwaga skoncentrowana jest na 
podziale pracy jako punkcie wyjścia do analizy zerowych kosztów transakcji. Z tego 
punktu widzenia  najlepszym przykładem świata zerowych kosztów transakcji jest wyspa 
Robinsona. Najczęściej jednak koncepcja zerowych kosztów transakcji wiązana jest  
z założeniem doskonałej informacji. Jeżeli założenie to doprowadzamy do jego 
logicznych granic nie ma mechanizmu rynkowego oraz znikają wszelkie trudności 
systemu centralnego planowania. Ta interpretacja jest zbieżna z hayekowską 
interpretacją rynku jako mechanizmu odkrywania wiedzy.  
 
 
